The extreme hunger and deprivation that recurs every year in the lean season in northern Bangladesh, locally known as the Monga, is mainly due to the malfunctioning local labor and credit markets. Using data covering 5,600 extreme poor households in the Mongaprone region, we investigate in detail the role of social capital in securing employment and obtaining informal loans. Correcting for the endogeneity of social capital by the heteroscedasticity-based method proposed by Klein and Vella (2010) and also by the standard IV method for a robustness check, we document that social capital plays an important role in obtaining both wage-and self-employment. We also document a weak negative effect of social capital on obtaining informal loans. We explain our results in terms of the role of horizontal and vertical components of our measures of social capital in influencing different outcomes.
Introduction
Seasonality in employment and income of the rural households in developing countries is well-known. Typically caused by rain-dependence in agriculture (Chaudhury and Paxson 2002) , seasonality in employment and income may sometimes be extreme enough to result in starvation and hunger. Malfunctioning of the rural labor and credit markets, which severely constrains consumption smoothing across seasons, is the primary reason behind these employment and income fluctuations (Sen 1981; Paxson 1993; Jacoby and Skoufias 1998) 
. The
Monga in northern Bangladesh is a unique example of such extreme seasonality.
1 It is a nearfamine situation in the lean season that recurs almost every year from mid-September to midNovember and is the main cause of plummeting employment and credit opportunities for the extreme poor in the pre-harvesting period of the Aman crop (the main rice crop in Bangladesh) (Sen 1981; Rahman 1995; Berg and Emran 2011) . 2 The contraction of the rural economic activity and the resulting lack of employment opportunities during the Monga not only reduce the possibility of selling labor in the spot market but also lower the proceeds of advance sales of labor in the future market to as low as 50% of those in the spot market. This situation is exacerbated by the absence of the rural credit markets, both formal and informal, thus increasing the need for effective consumption smoothing (Pitt and Khandker 2002; Amin, Rai 1 Monga is a Bengali dialect word referring to unemployment, food scarcity, hunger and starvation in northern Bangladesh. Khandker (2011) describes the Monga as a period of virtual economic inactivity and seasonal food deprivation, which sometimes rises to the level of famine.
2 In studying the 1974 famine in Bangladesh, Sen (1981) documented that, at the peak of the Monga, employment dropped to as low as 10% of the previous three-month average. Wage laborers and several service providers (such as boatmen and petty traders) whose livelihood depends on daily wages suffered the most. This resulted in a decline of "entitlement" of food, causing starvation and death. As much as 45% victims of the famine were day laborers, while small farmers (owning less than 0.5 acre of land) constituted a further 39%.
and Topa 2003). The Monga has been a grave policy concern for the government of Bangladesh and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
This paper investigates the role of social capital, a non-standard factor endowment, in securing employment and informal loans for the extreme poor during the Monga. We interpret the improved employment and informal loan opportunities of the extreme poor during this period as indicators of their reduced exposure to hunger and famine. Consequently, our analysis adopts various employment indicators, such as wage-employment and self-employment, and loan indicators as outcome variables. Our focus on informal borrowing is predicated on the fact that the extreme poor in Bangladesh are invariably denied access to formal financial institutions (Amin, Rai and Topa 2003; Mallick 2013 ).
The extreme poor comprise 25% of the population in Bangladesh and 40% of the population in the northern districts. Given their weak economic potential and almost nonexistent physical or human capital, or other form of productive assets, the extreme poor are the most vulnerable to the Monga. A comparison between the extreme poor and the average poor, who are typically targeted by NGOs, is instructive in illustrating the plight of the extreme poor (see Appendix A.1). While an average NGO-borrower poor person owns approximately 87 decimals of land, an extreme poor person owns only 4 decimals. The latter is no more than a homestead; 47% of the extreme poor own no land at all. The value of the dwelling house (excluding land), which can be considered as a proxy for non-land asset value, is approximately 8,000 and 1,200 Taka for the NGO-targeted poor and extreme poor, respectively. Moreover, although the average poor can borrow through microfinance programs, the extreme poor are excluded from these schemes because of their lack of creditworthiness. The extreme poor also lack human capital endowment. For example, the household head in an extreme poor household has only 0.53 years of schooling compared to 2.86 years for an NGO-targeted poor household.
As a more existential comparison, per capita consumption for the NGO-targeted poor is 2,284 calories per day, while more than 50% of the extreme poor cannot even manage food twice a day. All these features make the extreme poor the most vulnerable to the Monga.
Given the lack of physical and human capital, social capital is the only form of capital that the extreme poor can possibly own. The proponents of social capital argue that such assets as networks, trust, and reciprocity assist households greatly during economic hardships and shocks (Durkheim 1895; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993) . For example, social capital helps economic exchange, particularly in agrarian societies where formal institutions are largely absent (Bardhan 1984; Basu 1986) . Although many useful roles played by social capital are documented [Bakshi, Mallick, and Ulubaşoğlu (2015) provide a review], its role in mitigating the adverse effect of the Monga remains unexplored in the literature.
We define social capital as social characteristics that enable an individual to benefit from information flows and to reap the market and non-market returns from interaction with others. To measure the social capital of a household, we consider three distinct types of social interactions: i) help received from non-relative neighbors, ii) invitation received from nonrelative neighbors, and iii) participation in the shalish (a social system for informal adjudication of petty disputes by community members), all in the past one year. This information is recorded in the survey as binary responses (yes or no). Although information about repeated interactions, if any, is not available, the incidence of interactions can arguably provide a sufficient sense of whether an extreme poor household can be considered to own social capital. In our data, 27%, To address the endogeneity of social capital, we employ two alternative identification strategies. The first is a heteroscedasticity-based approach proposed by Klein and Vella (2009; 2010 ) that does not rely on exclusion restrictions. This is our main identification strategy. To check for robustness, we also employ the instrumental variable-based identification method, with our instrumental variable (IV) being the number of open-access resources in the neighborhood of the extreme poor. Conditional on the covariates, this IV categorizes the households into different groups with randomly varying access to social capital construction platforms, hence usefully identifying the unbiased effect of social capital (see Section 5.3 for details). We find that the IV results support the results based on the heteroscedasticity-based identification.
Our results document that all three measures of social capital increase the likelihood of self-employment. Given the small-scale self-employment activities undertaken by the extreme poor (see Appendix A.3 for a detailed list), the market for their products and services is also targeted to similar extreme poor households. Greater social capital provides better information about the market (potential customers and their locations), and, consequently, increases the profitability of self-employed activities. On the other hand, only participation in shalish has a significant effect on wage-employment. This result is understandable from the vertical aspect of social capital generated from participation in shalish. Since potential employers of the extreme poor come from the upper hierarchy in the community (rich households), rather than other extreme poor, households with networks with the upper hierarchy are more likely to be wage-employed. Quantifying the effect, participating in shalish increases female wageemployment during the Monga that can be translated into an income increase equivalent to 30 kilograms of coarse rice at the prevailing market price. However, social capital has a (weak) negative effect on the probability of obtaining informal loans. The reason is intuitive. Given that the higher degree of social capital increases the likelihood of both self-and wageemployment opportunities, households are less likely to resort to informal loan in times of distress during the Monga.
This paper makes several distinct contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only study that investigates the role of social capital in combating the Monga. Second, we study the extreme poor because they are the cohort most vulnerable to the Monga. The facts that the extreme poor are typically illiterate and lack access to alternative sources of information, such as NGO or radio/TV, offer the major advantage that the effects of social capital are unlikely to be confounded by other sources of information. Third, we address the endogeneity of social capital through a multi-pronged approach. Prior studies on social capital have categorically ignored this problem, raising serious doubts about the reliability of their estimates.
Our work is situated in a burgeoning literature that finds a strong connection between social capital and household well-being during economic hardships. While this literature investigates the role of social capital in mitigating idiosyncratic shocks, our study explores the same effect in the context of an aggregate shock that occurs at the regional level. Our work also resembles Berg and Emran (2011) , who demonstrate an important role for microfinance in reducing the adverse effects of the Monga. We differ from their study in terms of our focus on social capital and the extreme poor, who are typically excluded from the microfinance program.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background for the Monga problem. Section 3 discusses measurement of social capital for the extreme poor in the context of rural Bangladesh. Section 4 explains the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents our estimation and identification strategies. Section 6 discusses the results based on OLS and instrumental variable estimations. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Background and the Monga
Approximately 75 million people in Bangladesh live under conditions of poverty, hunger, and consumption rationing (FAO 2010) . The extreme poor lack productive assets, depend on an irregular daily wage income, face severe income shocks, and are, overall, the cohort most vulnerable to hunger and food insecurity (Halder and Mosley 2004 is as low as 71%, the share of manufacturing is only 10% (BBS 2002) , and the daily wage rate is 28% lower than the national average (Khandker, Khalily and Samad 2010) . This situation exacerbates the vulnerability of food provision for agricultural day laborers during the lean season, resulting in a famine-like situation. Households opt for advance sale of crops and labor at unfavorable terms, leading to chronic poverty. For example, a day-laborer receives as little as 50% from selling advance labor as would be received in the spot market (Rahman 1995) .
The Monga occurs between two harvesting periods every year in five northern districtsKurigram, Gaibandha, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari, and Rangpur-in the Rangpur division. 4 The harvesting periods in Bangladesh are divided into two major cropping seasons-Aus and Aman.
The Aus starts in April, and harvesting takes place in July-August. However, the main crop is Aman, comprising the period from July to December. The Monga occurs during SeptemberNovember, when the stock of Aus runs out before the Aman harvesting starts in December.
October-November are the hardest months for the extreme poor, due to severely reduced 3 Rangpur is one of the seven administrative divisions in Bangladesh (also a district in the same division).
employment and food scarcity. 5 Since the extreme poor do not own an asset base and cannot save over the non-lean season, their ability to cope with the massive employment drop during the Monga is constrained significantly.
Because the local labor and credit markets either do not function properly or are absent altogether, governmental and non-governmental transfers become important for the subsistence of the extreme poor in the Monga region. The government, along with some NGOs, has undertaken various social safety net programs, including Vulnerable Group Feeding and Vulnerable Group Development programs, during employment and income fluctuations.
Despite such efforts, 9.3 million poor, including those in the Monga region, are still excluded from these safety net programs (World Food Programme 2010).
Measuring social capital
Social capital is a broad concept and, therefore, a precise definition depends on the specific context. We define social capital as social characteristics that enable an individual to benefit from information flows and to reap the market and non-market returns from interaction with others. This definition is slightly narrower than the one espoused by Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) and Karlan (2005) .
Given our context, we measure social capital generating information flow and networking by three distinct attributes: i) help from non-relative neighbors, ii) invitation to visit non-relative neighbors, and iii) participation in shalish, all in the last one year. 6 The information is recorded as a binary response; we assign a value of 1 to each "yes" answer and a value of 0 to each "no" answer. However, information on the identity of individuals/households who either extended help, invitation to visit, or requested to participate in shalish to the extreme poor was not recorded.
Help includes i) cooked food and food items, such as rice, salt, eggs, pulses, and spices, as either a gift or a loan; ii) accompaniment to visit the doctor, hospital, and pharmacy; iii) assistance in trading productive assets, such as cattle and trees; and iv) information about jobs, relief, and informal loans. These types of help manifest the extreme poor's participation in the social network with compassion, support, attachment, commitment, and reciprocity, and, thus, Invitation is usually received from individuals or households of similar socio-economic status, thus capturing the horizontal social network. This measure is more pertinent in the current context, since the sample households consist of only the extreme poor. It needs to be stressed that, in order to be invited by non-relatives, the relationship must be both strong and based on mutual trust and recognition. Invitation, therefore, indicates that the individual is included and valued in the community (Baum and Ziersch 2003; Goodman et al. 1998 ). Shalish is a social system designed to settle petty disputes in the community without resorting to costly legal procedures. The system reprimands and punishes an individual who violates certain norms and values of the society. The extreme poor are usually invited to participate in shalish by their peers to support their cause, thus representing the horizontal social network. However, unlike the other two measures, participation in shalish has an additional dimension. Traditionally, the rural elite, which includes rich, socially and politically influential persons, and elected local government representatives, always present in the shalish as power brokers and to give the final verdict. Therefore, attending shalish provides an opportunity for the extreme poor to interact with individuals of upper hierarchies in the community, although their interactions may not always be on equal terms. Therefore, attending shalish also represents a vertical social network.
It is important to bear in mind that, although both horizontal and vertical networks help disseminate information, the type of information may depend on access to the type of networks.
For example, horizontal networks, in terms of interactions among the extreme poor, are less likely to provide information about potential job opportunities; rather, interactions with rich people, who are potential employers, may provide such information.
Although the data do not allow to separate out ex ante the horizontal and vertical nature of interactions, our results can still shed light on these interactions, depending on which measure of social capital influences the outcome variables.
It is important to issue a caveat that information flow and network channels of social capital may reduce moral hazard and hold-up problems and, thus, can increase one's bargaining power. We do not investigate these channels in detail, mainly because of the lack of data. For example, we do not have data on either the frequency of interactions or the durability of the relationship, which would help measure the extent to which moral hazard and hold-up problems are reduced. In addition, bargaining power is not quite a relevant concern for the extreme poor.
Moreover, any potential sources of bargaining power, such as education and land ownership, is already controlled for in our estimations and, hence, are orthogonal to our social capital measurement. Therefore, we focus only on the broader channels that our measures of social capital capture.
Data and descriptive statistics
Data were collected in 2002 as a part of a baseline survey for BRAC's "Challenging 10 We do not have disaggregated employment data, such as the number of hours a day and the number of days a month worked. It is important to note that respondents cannot recall such details of past employment. Therefore, we cannot distinguish full-time and part-time employment from the data.
Information on location of employment is also not available, so we are unable to determine migration patterns during the Monga. However, the poor in our sample region hardly migrate, considering the associated uncertainty of finding a job in the new destination and the economic consequences of borrowing and spending money to travel to the destination (Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak 2014) .
Empirical specification and identification
In the following, we first present our empirical specification and discuss the choice of the control variables that separate the effect of social capital from other confounding factors. Social capital is likely to be endogenous, for the reasons mentioned in the Introduction. We address this problem by using two alternative methods. The first is heteroscedasticity-based identification proposed by Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) , which does not require exclusion restrictions; this is our main identification strategy. The second is the conventional instrumental variables-based identification strategy with exclusion restrictions, which we employ as a robustness check.
Empirical specification
We estimate the following linear equation: and an all-weather road and the availability of electricity. Village level variables also account for any non-randomness in program placement, since the data came from BRAC's TUP program.
Heteroscedasticity-based identification
Our main identification strategy is a variant of the approach proposed by Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) . 12 This method requires that the endogenous variable be binary. It exploits non-spherical disturbances arising in the determination of social capital. The primary intuition behind this identification is that, with substantial heteroscedasticity in the equation relating the endogenous variable to the exogenous variables, the changing variance in the residual acts as a "probabilistic shifter" of the endogenous variable. Analogous to the instrumental variables, this probabilistic shifter helps trace out the causal relationship between the dependent variable (employment or loan) and the endogenous variable (binary social capital). Consider the following equations: 
where i u is the zero mean homoscedastic residuals, i X  is a subset of (or equal to) i X , and
S X  is a non-constant positive function. The probability of the binary endogenous indicator is given by S X  is not a constant function, and identification exploits data from the region where P(.) is linear. Therefore, the predicted probability of equation (5) works as a valid instrument of the binary endogenous variable, provided that there is heteroscedasticity in the residuals (Klein and Vella 2009; 2010 (2) and (3).
Exclusion restrictions-based identification
For this identification approach, our external instrument is the number of open-access resources (not to be confused with common-property resources) that extreme poor households can access in their neighborhood. These resources include i) fallow lands, ii) water bodies (ponds or canals), and iii) small forests and woodlands. Fallow lands are often visited by the extreme poor for grazing cattle and collecting cow-dung to be used as fuel after drying. Water bodies, such as swamps, are visited for collecting water lilies and green leaves for food. Small forests and woodlands are visited for collecting dry leaves and fallen tree branches for fuel and firewood. These resources are privately owned, so the extreme poor cannot relocate to these places and establish ownership. Traditionally, in rural Bangladesh, the owners of the openaccess resources, who are usually relatively rich, allow others to use these resources without any formal permission, as long as the property is not damaged. From the point of instrument validity, it must be emphasized that extreme poor households are not concentrated, unlike slums in the cities, in any particular part of the village. Bangladesh is very homogenous in terms of language, ethnicity, and religion, with the predominant majority being Muslims.
People, even the extreme poor, unlike the (lower caste) Hindus in either India or Nepal, are not concentrated based on either caste (which is prohibited in Islam) or occupation, ruling out any selection in the probability of access to these resources. Additionally, open-access resources exhibit strong within-village variability, in that extreme poor households have variable levels of access to these areas, given their scattered locations within the village, and there are many such resources within a given settlement.
It must be stressed that access to these resources does not create, either directly or indirectly, any type of self-or wage-employment for the extreme poor. Although access to these resources supports subsistence consumption to some extent, the livelihood of the extreme poor does not depend on accessing these resources. This is clearly evident from the occupations open areas, by which the social capital level of the extreme poor differs, given the extent of their access to these resources. Nevertheless, we take a cautious approach and interpret the results estimated by the IV method as a robustness check.
Results
We first present the results with OLS as benchmark; this is followed by Tobit estimations. We then present the endogeneity-corrected results. In all cases, we cluster the standard errors at the village level, given that the Monga is an aggregate shock and the village is the smallest unit experiencing such shocks.
OLS results
The OLS results are presented in Panel A in Table 2 . The results show that help and invitation positively contribute to total employment. These are due to their effects on selfemployment. We do not find a significant effect of any measure of social capital on wageemployment, except for a positive effect of invitation on male wage-employment. Moreover, shalish has no effect on any type of employment, yet it is the only measure of social capital that affects informal loans, with the effect being negative. but also for preventing omitted variables from causing bias in the estimation. Moreover, those covariates are necessary for a reliable IV estimation to be able to block potential avenues for the violation of exclusion restrictions.
We next estimate the benchmark specification with Tobit, given the truncation associated with the outcome variables. Our sample comprises households with no record of either employment or loans from informal sources, which might be due either to the individuals' inability to obtain employment or loans, even if they attempted to, or simply to the weak supply side of the local economy. Since only approximately 5% of the extreme poor in the sample managed to obtain informal loans, we additionally estimate a probit model treating this outcome as binary (1 = if received any informal loan; 0 = no).
The results estimated by the Tobit model are presented in Panel B. These are qualitatively similar to those obtained with OLS, with the exceptions being that shalish is now not significantly related to informal borrowing but is related to (female) self-employment. As a methodological matter, the Tobit regression is efficient, but it relies on distributional assumptions. The probit results are also consistent with Tobit findings (Panel C).
Insert Comparing the estimates across different groups, one can understand the effects of different intensities of social capital. To proceed, we first sum all three binary measures of social capital to construct an "Aggregate" measure. This measure ranges between 0 (no social capital) and 3
(maximum). Second, we create four dummies from this "Aggregate" measure-i) households with no social capital, ii) households with any one component of social capital, iii) households with any two components of social capital, and iv) households with all three components of social capital. We include the last three dummies (households with no social capital as the base category) in the regression to compare whether larger endowment of social capital has incremental effects. Finally, we construct a dummy indicating whether a household is endowed with any social capital (1 if at least one of help, invitation, or shalish is "yes"; 0 otherwise), which we refer to as a "Binary Aggregate."
Given that both OLS and Tobit have yielded qualitatively similar results, we now estimate these specifications by OLS. The results are presented in Table 3 . Column (2) Insert Table 3 here
One important finding is that the OLS results are robust to alternative methods of aggregation of the three measures of social capital. Therefore, in our IV estimation, in addition to the three individual measures of social capital, we estimate a fourth model using the Binary Aggregate index. The reason for this is that the Klein-Vella heteroscedasticity-based identification applies to a binary and single endogenous variable. Furthermore, since we have one external instrument, we can correct the endogeneity of only one variable in the case of instrumental variables-based identification.
IV results: Heteroscedasticity-based identification
The results are summarized in Table 4 . Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 present the results for help, invitation, shalish, and the Binary Aggregate index, respectively. Greater social capital, in terms of receiving help from neighbors, increases the likelihood of total and selfemployment (for both male and female members) but not wage-employment. Similarly, increased social capital, in terms of receiving invitation, increases the likelihood of selfemployment, especially for the female. On the other hand, the effect of attending shalish is more pronounced, as shalish also increases the likelihood of receiving wage-employment. For example, households that have a member attending shalish in the last one year have a 18%
higher likelihood of their members finding wage-employment than do households whose member did not attend shalish. The relevant likelihoods are 21% and 27% for male and female wage-employment, respectively, and 22% for self-employment.
The quantitative implication of these effects for the extreme poor is very large.
Assuming 45 days of wage work during the Monga period, and given the average daily female wage rate of 28.72 Taka, the monetary value of attending shalish is, on average, 349 Taka (= 45 * 28.72 * 0.27). Given the average price of coarse rice per kilogram at the local village market as being 11.65 Taka at the time of survey, the increased income could buy 30 kilograms of coarse rice (both the female wage rate and rice price are calculated from the village level survey data).
Insert Table 4 here When the Binary Aggregate index of social capital is used as the regressor, the results are very similar; a significant effect on self-employment and a weak effect on wageemployment. This is understandable, because we find above that only shalish, and not either help or invitation, has a significant effect on wage-employment, while all three components have a significant effect on self-employment.
In the case of informal loan, only attending shalish has an impact, pointing to the reduced likelihood of receiving informal loans.
IV results: Identification based on exclusion restrictions
Before presenting the results, we first discuss the first stage regressions of the endogenous variables. For all individual measures of social capital and the Binary Aggregate index, the coefficient of the instrument is highly significant. For example, the coefficients The IV results based on the exogenous instrument are similar to the benchmark KleinVella (2010) IV results. In the case of self-employment and its disaggregation by gender, not only the signs and statistical significances but also the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are very similar when using both estimation methods. However, unlike the benchmark IV results, but more in line with the OLS results, the instrumental variable-based effect of social capital on wage-employment is now positive and significant. More specifically, these are the effect of help on wage-employment, the effect of help and the Binary Aggregate index on male wage-employment, and the effect of invitation on female wage-employment. In the case of informal loan, the effect of help, as opposed to attending shalish in the benchmark IV estimation, is now negative and significant.
Insert Table 5 here
We recognize that satisfying the exclusion restriction may be difficult in practice, therefore, the results in this section are intended to be a verification tool for the reliability of the benchmark Klein-Vella (2010) IV approach. Despite the fact that these two approaches might rest on different sections of the data for information and differ in terms of statistical efficiency (i.e., Klein-Vella is less efficient than the IV method), we find that the two sets of results are largely comparable. This suggests that the violation of our exclusion restrictions is unlikely to be the case, given that the Klein-Vella method is free from such a requirement.
Discussions of the results
Our results are informative about the role of the horizontal and vertical nature of interactions in explaining the outcome variables, even though the data cannot separate out these interactions ex ante, since information on the identity of individual/household who either extended help or invitation to visit or attend shalish was not recorded.
We find that all three social capital components, help, invitation, and shalish, have a positive and significant effect on self-employment. These results can be understood by the horizontal nature of these social interactions among the extreme poor, as discussed in Section 3. The extreme poor constitute the market for the products and services of small-scale selfemployment activities undertaken by the extreme poor. Greater interactions among the extreme poor provide better information about the market (potential customers and their locations), and, consequently, increase the profitability of these self-employed activities.
On the other hand, only participation in shalish has a positive significant effect on wage-employment. It is worth reiterating that, out of the three components of social capital, only attending shalish creates an additional opportunity for the extreme poor to interact with the upper hierarchy in the community (rich households), thus representing the vertical aspect of social capital. Since potential employers of the extreme poor come from the rich households, rather than from other extreme poor, households endowed with this vertical component of social capital are more likely to be wage-employed.
We also find that social capital has a (weak) negative effect on the probability of obtaining informal loans. Although this result is hard to further explain from the available data, it can be argued that, since greater social capital increases the likelihood of both self-and wageemployment opportunities, households are less likely to resort to informal loans in times of distress during the Monga. A key feature of our analytical approach is addressing the endogeneity of social capital, a problem that has been categorically ignored in the related previous work. Our main identification strategy relies on an innovative approach that exploits heteroscedasticity rather than relying on exclusion restrictions. As a robustness check, we compare the results employing the identification strategy based on exclusion restrictions. The heteroscedasticity-based benchmark results are robust to the alternative IV method. The discrepancies that we observe between our OLS estimates and those that are corrected for endogeneity raise concerns about the results of the previous literature, which left the endogeneity of social capital unaddressed.
Our analyses document that, in the absence of other forms of capital, the extreme poor households with higher levels of social capital have greater success in finding wage-and selfemployment. Specifically, the vertical social network (representing an employer-employeetype relationship) in the form of participation in shalish plays a significant role in wageemployment. Quantifying the effect, a shalish participation increases female wageemployment during the Monga that can be translated into 30 kilograms of coarse rice at the local market price. In contrast, both horizontal and vertical social networks increase selfemployment. We also find that social capital decreases the informal borrowing during the Monga, probably because households with greater social capital have better self-and wageemployment opportunities, thus relying less on informal loans to cope with the adverse effect of the Monga.
The Monga is an aggregate economic shock, and individuals with higher social capital are likely to find employment at the expense of those with lower social capital. Therefore, in the present context we do not argue for a general equilibrium effect of social capital. Recent studies demonstrate that information, combined with insurance in the form of loans to migrate outside the region for employment during the Monga, has a significant impact on both income and consumption (Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak 2014) . Our results indicate that social capital partially mitigates the information problem but not the insurance problem for the extreme poor, thus suggesting an area of intervention. Tables   Table 1 Descriptive Informal loan is binary: "biprobit" estimation; marginal effects reported. 
A3 List of employment during

